Retirement Incentives—The Carrot and the Stick: Why No One Works Beyond 65 Anymore by Quinn, Joseph F.
Upjohn Institute Press 
Retirement Incentives- The 
Carrot and the Stick: 
Why No One Works Beyond 65 
Anymore 
Joseph F. Quinn 
Boston College 
Chapter 4 (pp. 57-76) in: 
Current Issues in Workers' Compensation 
James Chelius, ed. 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1985 
DOI: 10.17848/9780880995498.ch4 
Copyright ©1985. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
4
Retirement Incentives— 
the Carrot and the Stick*
Why No One Works 
Beyond 65 Anymore
Joseph F. Quinn 
Boston University
Introduction
The topic of this year's Economic Lecture series is the 
Economics of Aging. I am delighted with this choice of 
topic. It is an extremely interesting, important, and timely 
one, and it is one of the few issues on which I have any exper 
tise. There are many aspects of the economics of aging that 
you will hear discussed this year. I have chosen only one of 
them, the retirement decision—"Why No One Works 
Beyond 65 Anymore: the Carrot and the Stick."
The presentation has four parts. I will first point out that 
something is happening. Retirement patterns have changed, 
and changed dramatically. Second, I will speak briefly about 
why this is important. Third, I will ask why this is occurring 
and finally, what we can do about it.
I will concentrate on the third of these. Why is it that these 
changes in retirement patterns are occurring? Why are peo-
*Much of this presentation was drawn from an article by Richard V. Burkhauser (Vander- 
bilt University) and Joseph F. Quinn, "Influencing Retirement Behavior: A Key Issue for 
Social Security," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Fall 1983. More technical 
background material can be found in two earlier papers by the same authors, "Is Man 
datory Retirement Overrated? Evidence from the 1970's," Journal of Human Resources, 
Summer 1983 and "The Effect of Pension Plans on the Pattern of Life-Cycle Compensa 
tion," in The Measurement of Labor Cost (Jack Triplett, editor), NBER Studies in Income 
and Wealth, Volume 48, University of Chicago Press, 1983.
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pie retiring earlier than they used to? I will emphasize only 
one component of the answer to what is obviously a very 
complex question. That component concerns economic in 
centives—incentives imbedded in our social security and pen 
sion systems, incentives that induce retirement, I will argue, 
by penalizing the work effort of older workers. Social securi 
ty and employer pensions impose pay cuts, large pay cuts in 
some cases, on older workers. These cuts do not occur 
through the paycheck, but through a much more subtle but 
no less effective mechanism. Many older workers respond 
exactly how you might expect to the pay cuts—they stop 
working and retire.
Retirement Trends
Table 1 lays out the facts to be explained—the mystery to 
be solved. It includes longitudinal data on labor force par 
ticipation rates from 1950 to 1981, by age and by sex. I draw 
your attention to the last two columns—data for men and 
women aged 55-64 and 65 and over. You will notice here a 
remarkable demographic trend. As recently as 1950, nearly 
half of American men over 64 were still in the labor force. 
A mere 30 years later, that proportion is down to less than 
1 in 5.
Obviously, my title is a bit inaccurate. It is not true that 
nobody works beyond 65 anymore, but it is true that what 
was once a very common phenomenon, men over 65 work 
ing, is now relatively rare.
For the next category of men, 55-64, people of early retire 
ment age, the pattern is similar though less dramatic. Within 
these same 30 years, the proportion still in the labor force 
has dropped from near 90 percent to near 70 percent. 
Something is happening.
As you can see, the statistics for women are quite dif 
ferent. The reason is that there are two trends underway
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simultaneously. First, folks are retiring earlier. But second, 
more women are working than used to. These trends tend to 
offset each other for women over 65. The participation rate 
has stayed in the 8 to 10 percent range since 1950. For 
women of early retirement age, the increased labor force par 
ticipation has dominated the early retirement trend, and the 
proportion working has grown from 27 to 41 percent.
Table 1
Labor Force Participation Rates 





























































































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the President 
(1982).
Chart 1 is a picture of the same phenomenon, except that 
it uses individual ages rather than broad categories. If we 
define normal retirement age as the age at which half of the 
cohort are out of the labor force, we can use this chart to
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Chart 1
Labor Force Participation Rates 
Males and Females, 1950 to 1982
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY AGE
Molea. 195O — 1982
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY AGE
Femoles, 1950 — 1982
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show what has happened to normal retirement age over these 
years. Back in 1950, for example, it was not until age 70 that 
half the men were out of the labor force. By 1970, 20 years 
later, 65 was the age at which half the men had withdrawn. 
Today that age is below 63. As you have seen, the picture for 
women is different. Despite a downturn in the early 1970s, a 
time, by the way, when social security benefits rose 
dramatically in real terms, the general trend for women has 
been up or steady, even in the oldest categories.
When one aggregates men and women, which I have not 
done here, the conclusion is clear: people are retiring earlier 
than they used to. Our mission, should we decide to accept 
it, is to find out why people retire when they do. It may be 
that people retire when they have to, when debilitating health 
problems or mandatory retirement rules drive them from 
their jobs. On the other hand, people may retire when they 
choose to. They face financial incentives that encourage 
retirement, and many may be induced to do so.
A Source of Concern?
My second question is "why is this an issue?"—a polite 
way of asking "who cares?" Until recently, I think there was 
no particular alarm over these retirement trends. If anything, 
they were applauded. One of the goals of the early architects 
of the social security system, it has been argued, was to in 
duce older workers out of the very weak labor markets of the 
1930s.
But that goal, I suspect, faded during the war years and 
the more prosperous decades that followed. Nonetheless, 
this trend towards early retirement was viewed as a logical 
development in an increasingly wealthy society. Some of this 
wealth was spent on leisure, and some of this leisure was 
taken in the form of early retirement.
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But this retirement trend is no longer viewed as benign for 
at least two reasons. One is the financial crisis facing social 
security. The social security trust funds are basically nonexis 
tent these days. Current receipts from social security con 
tributors are paid directly to current recipients. It is a pay-as- 
you-go system. There is nothing wrong with a pay-as-you-go 
system as long as future receipts are adequate to meet future 
obligations. But this was recently not the case.
Some of the social security funding crisis was a temporary 
phenomenon due to the recessionary years of the 1970s—if 
you are willing to call more than a decade of recession tem 
porary. But part of the crisis is also due to these trends 
towards early retirement and to the early receipt of benefits 
by recipients.
The other reason for concern is anything but temporary. It 
derives from the well-known demographic fact that the age 
structure of America is changing. Currently, about 11 per 
cent of our population is 65 or older. By 2025, this will grow 
to between 17 and 20 percent. The whole country will soon 
look like Florida, not with respect to winter weather, unfor 
tunately for you Michigan residents, but with respect to the 
age distribution.
Even without changing retirement patterns, fewer workers 
per retiree would put strains on the social security system, 
implying either higher taxes for contributors, lower benefits 
for recipients, or both. When this demographic trend is com 
bined with the fact that people are retiring earlier, the prob 
lems are compounded.
I think that older workers will be very much needed in the 
labor force of the future because they will be a larger propor 
tion of the population. I fear that the elderly may be unwill 
ing to work unless the financial incentives that I will discuss 
this evening are changed.
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Retirement Determinants
In 1977, Congress changed the age of earliest mandatory 
retirement from 65 to 70. With a couple of minor exceptions, 
it is now illegal to have a mandatory retirement prior to age 
70. Many people, including President Reagan and Rep. 
Claude Pepper, a leading spokesman for older American in 
Congress, favor outlawing mandatory retirement altogether. 
The entire concept may be legislated out of existence.
An interesting research question is whether this would 
make a difference. At first blush, it appears that it would. 
Prior to 1977, mandatory retirement provisions were a 
widespread phenomenon in the U.S. Between 40 and 50 per 
cent of workers faced them, and many people retired at their 
mandatory retirement age. When one compares the behavior 
of people with and without mandatory retirement, their 
behavior is quite different.
Richard Burkhauser and I followed a sample of employed 
older workers (aged 62 to 64 in 1983, drawn from the Social 
Security Administration's Retirement History Study (RHS)) 
over a two-year period during which some of them faced 
mandatory retirement. Of those who did, only 17 percent 
were still working in 1975. Of those who did not face man 
datory retirement, nearly 60 percent were still employed. 
This is a big difference in behavior and a large potential 
mandatory retirement effect.
But coincidence does not imply causation. I will argue 
tonight that there are important financial incentives that go 
into effect (or increase in magnitude) at exactly the same 
time that mandatory retirement occurs. It is difficult to say 
without considerable investigation that mandatory retire 
ment was the reason why these people retired when they did. 
It is not easy to discern "who dunnit?" or in this case "what 
dunnit?"
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Social security, pensions and mandatory retirement are all 
very closely intertwined. It is extremely important to under 
stand how each of these determinants (and others, such as 
health, marital status, attitudes and expectations) influence 
the retirement decision. Why is it important? If mandatory 
retirement was forcing people out of the labor force at age 
65, then a change in the mandatory retirement law, as we had 
in 1977, or its outright elimination will have a substantial im 
pact on aggregate behavior. On the other hand, if it was not 
mandatory retirement but other factors that occur at the 
same time, then changing the mandatory retirement law will 
have very little effect on retirement trends.
Mandatory retirement and pensions tend to come hand 
and hand. In the sample of older workers mentioned above, 
nearly all (91 percent) of those facing mandatory retirement 
also had pensions. Most became eligible at exactly the same 
time as mandatory retirement and most were eligible for full 
rather than reduced benefits at that time. On the other hand, 
of those people who were not subject to mandatory retire 
ment, fewer than half (47 percent) had pensions. If pensions 
induce people to retire, and I think they do, then much of 
what may look like a mandatory retirement effect may be the 
impact of these pensions.
Mandatory retirement and social security are even easier 
to link. The age of full social security eligibility is age 65. 
That is also the age, we will see, when a very important 
change in the social security law occurs. This change will 
play a key role in solving the mystery below.
Age 65 is important for another reason. Prior to 1977, this 
was by far the most popular age for mandatory retirement. 
If social security induces people to retire, and I think it does, 
much of its effect might also be attributed to mandatory 
retirement.
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Let's look at the modus operand! of our suspects. Man 
datory retirement is the simplest, although there are 
subtleties in some of the provisions. They generally state that 
an individual must leave the job when turning a certain age, 
or at the end of that calendar year. It is a straightforward 
and blunt instrument. It is the "stick" of the title of this 
talk.
Social security and employer pensions, on the other hand, 
are promises of income streams in the future. They are very 
complicated promises, and have many important dimen 
sions, such as the age of eligibility, the size of the retirement 
benefit, whether that amount is adjusted for inflation after 
retirement, and what happens to that amount if one decides 
to delay retirement and continue working.
All of these aspects of the retirement contract are impor 
tant determinants of how valuable these promises are. In em 
pirical work, one must describe these complicated ar 
rangements in a simple summary form. How big are an in 
dividual's pension and social security rights? The most 
popular way to answer this question is in terms of the annual 
benefit; for example, $6,000 per year. But that answer ig 
nores other aspects of the pension that are extremely impor 
tant. It says nothing about when one is eligible. It says 
nothing about what happens to the benefit after retirement. 
Is the $6,000 fixed, or does it grow with the cost of living? 
And what happens to the benefit if one decides to forgo the 
pension and work another year? Will the annual benefit in 
crease, and if so, by how much?
A far superior summary statistic of the value of a pension 
is the wealth or asset equivalent of that promise. In 
economists' terms, it is the present discounted value of the 
future income stream—the amount of money that would 
have to be invested today to provide exactly the income 
stream that is promised. Because investments pay interest,
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dollars promised farther and farther in the future are the 
equivalent to smaller and smaller amounts today.
As an example, with an interest rate of 10 percent, an in 
vestment of $60,000 would provide an annual income of 
$6,000 forever. A gift of $60,000 and a gift of $6,000 per 
year forever are exactly equivalent, given the 10 percent in 
terest rate. By lending or borrowing, one could always turn 
either one into the other.
If $6,000 annual income will not last forever (for example, 
it terminates at death) then the asset equivalent is less than 
$60,000. The precise amount can easily be calculated.
There are tremendous advantages to defining the value of 
social security or pension promises in terms of their asset 
equivalent. First, the age of eligibility is important. The far 
ther away it is, the lower current asset value of a given an 
nual benefit.
In addition, inflation protection is easily incorporated into 
this calculation, via the discount rate that translates future 
dollars into today's dollars. Indexed benefits are discounted 
at the real rate of interest, whereas nominal benefits that do 
not grow with the cost of living are discounted at the 
nominal rate—the real rate plus the rate of inflation.
With the concept of present discounted value in mind, let 
me ask the following question. The answer to this question is 
key to my view of the financial incentives in our pension 
plans. Suppose an individual is currently eligible for retire 
ment benefits of $6,000 per year until death. What happens 
to this annual benefit if the individual instead chooses to re 
main on the job and work another year?
There is good news and bad news. The bad news, with 
respect to the pension, is that the individual loses the $6,000. 
One does not draw pension benefits while continuing on the
67
job. The good news is that future annual benefits (employer 
pension or social security) are likely to exceed $6,000 because 
of that additional year of work.
Why are they higher? It is important to understand this. 
With respect to social security, future benefits increase for 
two reasons. First, annual benefits are based on a social 
security concept called average monthly earnings. With an 
additional year of work, average monthly earnings will rise, 
as will the subsequent benefit calculation.
In addition, there is a second reason—an actuarial adjust 
ment, which is basically a reward from the Social Security 
Administration for claiming checks for one fewer year. Be 
tween 62, the earliest age of social security eligibility, and 65, 
the actuarial adjustment is about 7 percent per year of delay. 
At 65, prior to 1983, it dropped to 1 percent. This adjust 
ment applies to all future checks. Most people recognize it in 
a slightly different form. Anyone contemplating retirement 
realizes that retirement at 62, the earliest age, rather than 
three years later, the normal age, entails a benefit reduction 
of 20 percent. This 20 percent is approximately three times 
the 7 percent annual figure that I have introduced.
Employer pensions are more complicated, because there 
are thousands of them, and each has its own individual re 
quirements, rules and regulations. But pension benefits are 
usually based on either years of service or on average earn 
ings over the last few years with the firm. Either of these is 
likely to grow with an additional year of work. In addition, 
some pension plans also have actuarial adjustments similar 
to that I described for social security.
The pension implication of the choice to retire or to work 
another year is not as simple as the choice between $6,000 
and zero. It is a choice between two pension streams—one 
that begins immediately and provides $6,000 per year, and
another that pays nothing in the first year, but higher annual 
benefits (say, $6,500) in the future. Which one of these 
streams is worth more? It depends—always a safe answer in 
economics. It depends on whether the future $500 annual in 
crements are sufficient to compensate for the $6,000 loss in 
the first year.
It is difficult to decide by looking at the streams, since the 
amounts arrive at different times. But as soon as they are 
translated into present discounted value, the answer is 
clear—the stream with the higher asset equivalent.
Suppose today's value of the first stream ($6,000, $6,000, 
$6,000, etc.) is $45,000, and the second ($0, $6,500, $6,500, 
etc.) is $50,000. Then working another year yields two 
benefits—paychecks for that year, which is certainly good 
news, and a $5,000 increase in the value of pension (or social 
security) rights. The latter increases by $5,000 because of the 
decision to work that year. As such, it is really a component 
of compensation. If the straight salary was $20,000 for the 
year, the true compensation was $25,000—$20,000 plus the 
$5,000 increment in pension wealth.
Unfortunately, it can work both ways. Suppose the pres 
ent discounted value of the second stream were $40,000 
rather than $50,000. What would true compensation be 
then? While the individual earns $20,000 in salary, the value 
of the pension rights drops by $5,000. Th true compensation 
is only $15,000 for the year of work.
An interesting question is which of these two scenarios is 
more likely to describe the situation facing older workers to 
day. Before presenting some actual data, let me just sum 
marize the results and describe the bottom line. Social securi 
ty and many pensions are structured so that at some 
point—and certainly by 65—the second scenario holds. The 
present discounted value of social security and employer 
pension rights begin to decrease with continued work. One
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pocket is filled by paychecks, while the other is picked by 
social security and pension rules. One's true compensation is 
less than it looks. This is the surreptitious pay cut I alluded 
to in the introduction.
When do these losses occur? They occur at different times 
for different people. But a major change in the incentives 
happens at age 65—precisely the age at which mandatory 
retirement was most likely to go into effect back when the 
Retirement History sample was being studied. This 
simultaneity makes it difficult, through not impossible, to 
discern exactly what was influencing individual behavior. 
Was it mandatory retirement, "the stick," or these financial 
incentives, "the carrot"—the pay cuts that often accompany 
age 65?
Table 2 shows actual data for a sample of employed men 
aged 63 to 65 in 1974. It illustrates what would have happen 
ed to the present discounted values of pension (top) and 
social security (bottom) rights if these workers had chosen to 
work another year. For 63 year old men, for example, there 
is relatively little change in the asset value of pensions. 
Similar proportions have them increased and decreased (the 
median is -$148), and most of the change is less than $1,000. 
(The 43 percent "unchanged" are those not eligible for pen 
sions.)
At age 64, however, there are significantly more losers 
than gainers, and the size of the losses has increased. The 
median person, ignoring those unchanged, would lose over 
$1,100 in pension wealth. By age 65, nearly everyone loses 
and the median loss exceeds $2,000.
The changes in social security wealth are much more 
dramatic. Until 65, the median person gains—over $1,800 at 
age 63 and $800 at 64. But at 65, beware. Everyone would 
lose social security wealth with continued work. The median 
loss for this particular sample of men was over $3,000.
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Table 2
Changes in Present Valueaof Employer Pensions
and Social Security Associated with an Additional Year
of Work, for Full-Time Employed Men
Age 63 to 65 in 1974
(Distribution in percent)
Employer pensions


















































































SOURCES: Data from the Retirement History Study of Social Security Administration;
calculations by Burkhauser and Quinn.
a. Present values calculated with a 5 percent discount rate.
b. Median calculation omits those with no change.
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Why the big change at 65? The reason is the legislated 
decrease in the actuarial adjustment, from 7 percent per year 
of delay between 62 and 64 to only 1 percent (in 1974) for 
each year of postponement after 65. The social security 
reward for continued work decreased dramatically, and 
became insufficient to compensate for a year of foregone 
benefits.
Whether these gains and losses are considered big depends 
on the object of comparison. Table 3 compares them to the 
individual's before-tax earnings. It calculates the wealth 
changes as a percent of salary.
The top half of the table refers to people who do not have 
pensions and are eligible for social security only. As was seen 
in table 2, the median person gains social security wealth at 
63 and at 64, but loses substantially at 65. The median loss in 
this sample is estimated to equal about a third of an annual 
salary.
Below are individuals eligible for both social security and 
pensions. At the median, there is a modest net gain in total 
retirement income wealth at 63, a small loss at 64, and a 
dramatic loss at 65. The median 65 year old in this sample 
would be working for approximately half pay because of the 
penalties implicit in the social security and pension systems.
These estimates are very rough, and may exaggerate the 
size of the pay cut. They ignore issues of taxation, and 
assume that anybody who works full time loses all social 
security benefits. In fact, with low enough earnings, one can 
both work and collect social security benefits. The point of 
the table is that the work disincentives can be large. And 
keep in mind that there are distributions around these me 




Changes in Present Value of Employer Pensions
and Social Security Associated with an Additional Year
of Work, as a Percentage of Annual Before Tax Earnings,
for Full-Time Employed Men
Age 63 to 65 in 1974
(Distribution in percent)
Eligible for social security only
Loss of 30 percent or more
10 to 30 percent
1 to 10 percent
Gain of 0 to 10 percent
10 to 20 percent
20 to 30 percent







































Eligible for social security and employer pension
Loss of 30 percent or more
10 to 30 percent
1 to 10 percent
Gain of 0 to 10 percent
Total
Median
10 to 20 percent
20 to 30 percent





























SOURCES: Data from the Retirement History Study of Social Security Administration; 
calculations by Burkhauser and Quinn.
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Let me summarize what we have seen thus far. I am con 
vinced that there are financial incentives to retire. At some 
age—certainly by 65, but earlier for many people—the 
values of social security and pension rights begin to decline if 
one continues to work.
Second, these work disincentives can be large relative to 
the paycheck. Third, these work disincentives grow 
significantly in magnitude at age 65, precisely the age of 
mandatory retirement prior to the 1977 legislation.
What I have not yet shown is that these incentives affect 
people's behavior. For that to occur, people must under 
stand them and respond to them. Richard Burkhauser and I 
have analyzed the impact of these incentives, using samples 
of older workers drawn from the Retirement History Study, 
and find strong evidence that this is the case. Variables 
describing the size of social security and pension wealth 
changes associated with continued work are very significant 
in explaining differences in individual retirement behavior. 
The larger the wealth losses, the more likely people are to 
withdraw from the labor force and retire. The people in the 
sample certainly behave as though they understand and res 
pond to financial incentives.
I can summarize about four years of research in a simple 
analogy—much as I hate to admit it. Consider the following 
contract. For any hour that you work before noon, you will 
be paid $10 per hour; for any hour you work after noon, you 
will be paid $6 per hour. How would you respond? Most 
people would try to pack all the work hours in before noon 
and head for the beach in the afternoon.
To oversimplify a bit, this is exactly what social security 
and pension systems do, except that noon is age 65. After age 
65, or earlier for some, true compensation decreases because 
social security and pension rights become less and less
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valuable with continued work. This occurs because higher 
benefits in the future do not adequately compensate for 
benefits foregone today.
Burkhauser and I have also found that about half of the 
difference in behavior we observed between people who did 
and did not have mandatory retirement could be explained 
by other factors, primarily the financial incentives I have 
described. Mandatory retirement is nowhere near as impor 
tant as it looks. We predict, therefore, that changing the law, 
as we did in 1977, or eliminating mandatory retirement 
altogether would have only a modest effect on aggregate 
behavior.
Changing the mandatory retirement law was a good idea, 
because people who really want to remain at their jobs can 
do so—at least until age 70. But, I think it will have only 
small impact on retirement patterns. Why? I return to the 
title of this talk—"the Carrot and the Stick." Even if depriv 
ed of the stick, mandatory retirement, employers still retain 
the carrot, the incentives built into their pensions systems. 
Mandatory retirement and actuarially unfair pension 
systems are alternative means to the same end.
To change retirement behavior, it is essential to change the 
incentives. To some extent we already have. The 1 percent 
actuarial adjustment that social security applies after age 65 
has already been increased in 1982 to 3 percent per year of 
delay. Although this is still far from actuarially fair, it does 
decrease the size of the work disincentives, and is a move in 
the right direction.
The incentives will be changed even further by a rarely 
publicized and little understood part of the legislation passed 
in April of 1983. This legislation delayed the cost of living 
adjustment for social security recipients for six months. It in 
troduced the taxation of the social security benefits of high
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income recipients. It proposes delaying the age of full social 
security eligibility from 65 to 67 by the year 2027. But most 
important from our perspective, it increases the actuarial ad 
justment from 3 to 8 percent over a twenty year period begin 
ning in 1990. This may seem like a minor component of the 
legislation, but I think it is an important one. It makes social 
security wealth much less dependent on the age of retire 
ment, and significantly decreases the size of the implicit pay 
cuts accompanying old age.
As an economist, I believe that people respond to financial 
incentives. My research confirms this. However, I will be the 
first to admit, if you haven't beaten me to it, that people re 
spond to many other things as well. I do not mean to imply 
that this is the whole story of retirement—the whole answer 
is the question of why people retire when they do. Attitudes 
towards work are very important, as are health status, living 
arrangements, and expectations about the future. But the in 
centives that I have described tonight are also important. 
And they are more easily changed by public policy, such as 
legislation, than many of the other determinants. 
Acknowledging the incentives that are hidden in our pension 
and social security systems is essential to understanding what 
has occurred in the past and influencing what will happen in 
the future.
